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In this work the integration of radar altimeter 
measurements into a GNSS position solution is 
investigated. The method is intended to be used in low 
altitudes just before landing of an aircraft in order to 
reduce a possible vertical bias and improve touchdown 
performance.  
 
The first section after an introduction and a motivation for 
the possible benefits introduces the proposed method 
which follows mainly the idea of barometric altitude 
aiding. After an initial positioning solution the radar 
altimeter measurement and digital terrain elevation data 
are used to create additional ranging information in 
vertical direction.  
 
The next section discusses the uncertainties in this 
additional measurement. Apart from the obvious 
measurement noise, special focus is put on the look-up of 
terrain elevation data, since this is the most critical step in 
the process.  
 
Finally this method is tested with flight trial data from late 
2009. The results clearly show the potential but also the 




Landing in low visibility weather conditions is still one of 
the remaining challenges for the use of satellite navigation 
in aviation. Current research is assuming that LPV or 
even CAT-I requirements can be met with space based 
augmentation systems (SBAS) and receiver autonomous 
integrity monitoring (RAIM) techniques in near future 
[1]. However, for operations beyond CAT-I the situation 
is different. The tolerable integrity risk of 10-9 and the 
other required performance parameters for automatic 
landings will most likely only be met with a ground based 
augmentation system (GBAS) system at the airport [2]. 
The milestone to get system design approval for CAT-I 
GBAS has been reached in the US and Australia and is 
expected to be reached very soon in Europe as well. But 
research focus is now moving on to CAT-III operations. 
The corresponding requirements (GAST-D SARPS) have 
been drafted and frozen.  
 
All evaluations in this paper were based on the use of 
GBAS since it is the most precise system and all 
necessary data were available. However, this method is 
not limited to that and could also be used together with 
any other kind of augmentation system or other 
techniques ensuring integrity. 
 
System performance under almost all conditions is 
excellent and test results show that the average navigation 
system error (NSE) of an aircraft using GBAS is typically 
well below one meter. However, under very unfavourable 
conditions a bias-like error is assumed to be possible. [3] 
Such an error has an effect on where on the runway an 
aircraft touches down. A simple geometrical model relates 
a bias in the vertical position solution (Δh)  to an along-
track error of the touch-down point on the runway Δx, 


















Assuming a maximum vertical error of 10m 
(corresponding to the vertical alert limit close to the 
runway) the along-track error of the touch-down point at a 
typical 3° glide slope would be 190m which is quite 
significant.  
 
In this work the integration of radar altimeter 
measurements and terrain elevation data into the GNSS 
position solution is investigated to address this problem. 
This solution is intended to be used from (or shortly 
before) the 200ft decision height on the approach until the 
flare-out, i.e. for CAT-II and CAT-III operations. It is a 
very straight forward use of mostly already existing 
systems and information. In order to keep changes to 
current systems as small as possible it can be assumed 
that the radar altimeter in future GNSS-based automatic 
landing systems will still be used for vertical guidance 
from several feet above the runway until the actual touch-
down. For airports offering CAT-III operation capability, 
very accurate mapping requirements are already in effect 
[4]. The only additional information needed onboard the 
arriving aircraft, compared to today’s available 
information, is the digital elevation map of the area over 
which the plane is flying. GBAS corrections are used for 
initial positioning with the calculation of protection 
levels. A detailed analysis for possible errors in the 
additional altitude measurement and the elevation data 
from the map is crucial to evaluate the possible threats.  
 
The studies and simulations are finally verified with flight 
trial data which were obtained during a GBAS test 
campaign in late 2009 at DLR’s research airport in 
Braunschweig. First results show that especially in areas 
with very low terrain roughness (i.e. small variations 
between neighbouring data points) which is the case in 
the obstacle clearance area of a runway for CAT-III 
operations, this method provides a possibly great benefit 
for improved touch-down performance and a valuable 




The proposed architecture is a two step-algorithm and 
uses GBAS corrected GNSS data together with 
measurements from the radar altimeter onboard the 
aircraft. The radar altimeter is designed to measure the 
current aircraft altitude above ground level (AGL), 
typically at a rate of about 25Hz. In a first step a 
conventional GBAS position solution, together with the 
corresponding protection levels is calculated. The second 
step then combines the altitude measurements, the 
position solution and digital terrain elevation data 
(DTED) which contain the altitude above mean sea level 
(MSL) of the terrain at defined points. The altitude of the 
aircraft GNSS antenna above MSL consists of the 
elevation of the terrain, the measured distance from the 
ground to the aircraft and the difference in altitude of the 
radar altimeter antenna and the GNSS antenna. In the 
following a very short recapitulation of the principle of 
GNSS positioning is given, to be followed by a 
description of the integration of the new additional 
measurement.  
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where  is the measured, corrected and smoothed 
pseudorange, the weighted geometry matrix, S xˆ the 
position estimate and  the error term. The  in the 
weighting matrix are the expected standard deviations of 
the range measurement error. The derivation of these 
values is usually standardized, however for inclusion of 
the radar altimeter measurement a method for the 
corresponding standard deviation has to be developed. 
This will be done in the next chapter. 
 
GNSS positioning has the general problem that the 
geometry for the vertical estimate is much less favourable 
than for the horizontal one. This is due to the fact that 
generally the satellites in view are well distributed across 
the sky. However, no signals are received from below the 
user due to the obstruction from the earth. Therefore 
adding an additional measurement in vertical direction 
generally improves the condition of the geometry matrix 
and reduces the overall uncertainty in the calculated 
position solution.  
 
To increase positioning accuracy and, maybe even more 
important, to provide integrity information for arriving 
and departing aircraft, a GBAS at the airport determines 
corrections and integrity parameters which are broadcast 
via a VDB transmitter. A ground station typically has four 
antennas at carefully surveyed positions. From the 
measurements at these antennas the GBAS parameters for 
each satellite are derived by comparing the measured 
signals to the actual range which can be calculated since 
the satellite position and reference antenna positions are 
known.  
 
To reduce noise in the measurements the pseudoranges in 
the airborne system are carrier-smoothed with a 100 
second Hatch-filter (and additionally a 30s filter in the 
case of GAST D (GBAS Approach Service Type intended 
to support CAT II/III operations) for ionospheric 
disturbance detection) [5]. These smoothed and corrected 
measurements are then used in the position solution in the   vector.  
 
The main principle of the proposed integration in 
principle follows the way of barometric aiding to the 
GNSS solution as described in [6] and is depicted in the 
following scheme:  
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Figure 2: Overview of proposed architecture 
A GBAS position solution is calculated first, in order to 
determine the horizontal position. Together with the 
position estimate an error bound for the horizontal error is 
calculated, the so called protection level.  Based upon this 
(horizontal) position and the area of uncertainty the 
corresponding terrain elevations are taken from a digital 
terrain elevation map. The average of all terrain data 
points in this area of the map is used as terrain elevation. 
Together with the radar altitude measurement a new range 
is determined to a virtual satellite, which is located 
vertically under the aircraft’s horizontal position on the 
WGS-84 ellipsoid. If the range computed in this way 
matches the altitude computed in the GNSS solution with 
a certain tolerance, the new vertical range information is 
included in a new position solution, extended by one 
ranging source. The geometry matrix is extended by one 
row, respectively. Since the RA measurement does not 
contribute to the time offset, this additional row just 
contains the upward facing unit vector and a zero in the 
fourth column which is a column of ones for the receiver 
clock bias estimate in a conventional GNSS solution. If 
there were satellites in view then the new geometry 
matrix and the corresponding weighting matrix would be 
of dimension ( +1) x 4 and ( +1) x ( +1), 
respectively. With this new information a position 
solution is computed with the standard least squares 
method. Determining the standard deviation 
N
N N N
  for 
appropriate weighting of the new measurement is subject 
of the following section. 
 
Another benefit is that an additional consistency check 
between the two totally independent sensors GNSS and 
radar altimeter can be performed and possible undetected 
failures in satellite navigation as well as malfunctions of 
the radar altimeter are more likely to be detected. 
 
The overall behaviour of the system and the effects of 
different disturbances such as vegetation in terrain 
elevation are studied. With growing uncertainty in the 
additional range and adequate weighting, the solution 
converges to the GPS stand alone solution.  
 
THE ADDITIONAL MEASUREMENT AND 
UNCERTAINTIES   
The uncertainty in a GNSS measurement is usually 
expressed as a standard deviation σ of a Gaussian error 
distribution. Its derivation is a critical point and has to be 
evaluated in detail. We assume an additional ranging 
source right underneath the aircraft. Since the radar 
altimeter measures height above the (uneven) terrain only, 
a common worldwide reference is needed. The most 
natural choices seem to be either the centre of the earth or 
the vertical projection of the aircraft’s position onto the 
WGS84 ellipsoid. To avoid potential error sources due to 
the oblatness of the earth and the rectangular projection 
not going to the centre but the focal point of an ellipsoid 
we decided to take the position on the ellipsoid as 
reference. The situation is shown in figure 3.  
The actual radar altitude measurement  is only one 
part of the additional range. The other parts to be 
considered are the height difference h  between the 




Figure 3. The additional measurement and its 
components. 
terrain elevation map refers, the terrain height DTEDh  
taken from the map at the aircraft’s position and the 
height difference  between the GNSS antenna 
and the reference of the radar altimeter. The new range 
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Each of the parts of has its own sources of errors 
which shall be discussed in the following. 
H
 
_ant diffh : Despite the fact that the antennas are fixed on 
the aircraft, their height difference cannot be considered 
as constant. Due to deformations of the fuselage, but 
mainly due to varying pitch and roll angles of the aircraft 
this height difference changes. However, with precise 
knowledge of the aircraft’s current attitude (obtained e.g. 
either through an IMU or a GNSS receiver with several 
antennas) and the position of the antennas on the fuselage 
simple geometric calculations can account for this and 
eliminate most of this error. The residual error originates 
in unknown deformations of the fuselage and 
uncertainties in the exact attitude of the aircraft. As 
usually no better estimate for these error contributions are 
available we model them as Gaussian distributed with 
zero mean. The standard deviation depends largely on the 
quality of the IMU or any other sensor responsible for 
attitude determination.  
 
meash : As with all measurements the measured radar 
altitude is subject to measurement noise. Flight test results 
showed this very clearly during taxiing of the aircraft 
where the height above ground should remain constant. 
Especially during faster taxi periods and the takeoff roll 
measurements showed variations of up to half a meter. It 
should be noted, however, that the radar altimeter used in 
the flight trials was not intended to support autoland 
operations and. Current altimeters generally show much 
better performance. By specification [7] the maximum 
measurement error is defined +-3ft below 100ft indicated 
altitude and +-3% between 100ft and 500ft indicated 
altitude at the 95th percentile. The given values are upper 
bounds and can be modeled accordingly. This altitude 
dependent behavior was also observed during the flight 
WGS84 ellipsoid 
MSL 
Height difference between 
GNSS and RA antenna 
Measured radar altitude 
Surface of the earth Terrain elevation above MSL 
Additional „satellite“ 
tests. As in previous works on radar altimeter integration 
[8],[9] we also observed that the measured altitude was 
very dependent on the underground. Radar altimeters are 
designed to measure the altitude above ground and 
therefore significantly penetrate vegetation and to a big 
extent also snow. A certain small change in measured 
altitude depending on the extent of vegetation, amount of 
snow etc. has to be expected nevertheless. Thus the 
approach track where the radar altitude is used should be 
clear of obstacles and disturbances to create repeatable 
altitude measurement results. This, however, can be 
expected to be the case under the last few hundreds of 
meters of the approach track before the runway since this 
is the intended radar altimeter operation area. Another 
impact on the data quality originates from the type of 
sensors used. The available digital terrain elevation data 
(DTED) from the Braunschweig area were obtained 
through laser scanning. From the results discussed in the 
flight test chapter later on it is very obvious that the laser 
scanning method does not have the same penetration 
capabilities and thus a significant bias is introduced in the 
additional measurement if the database and the 
measurements are not created by the same or a 
comparable method. Another issue can arise due to the 
aircraft’s attitude and the characteristics of the radar 
altimeter. It transmits a defined signal and takes the first 
reflected signal as base for determination of the radar 
altitude. The antenna is fixed on the bottom of the 
fuselage and emits signals at a certain fixed beam width. 
This enables the radar altimeter to measure the shortest 
distance to the ground even with a bank and pitch angle. 
However, the area which is seen by the radar signals does 
change and in uneven terrain a certain point, other than 
the ground straight underneath the aircraft could reflect 
the signal and create an error as to what is measured. This 
situation is depicted in figure 4 where the distance (shown 
in red) to an obstacle is measured instead of the distance 
from the ground. Again, under the final approach track no 
obstacles should be present so that this influence does not 
create erroneous measurements either. 
 
 
Figure 4. Area covered by the radar altimeter and 
danger of taking the wrong reference. 
 
To obtain a precise new range, the aircraft’s horizontal 
position has to be known in order to take the correct 
terrain elevation from the database. This is a critical step 
since misleading position information automatically 
translates into a false terrain elevation information and 
thus directly into an error in the new additional range. To 
avoid this, a horizontal position with integrity information 
is needed for the look-up of the terrain elevation. If the 
position, together with the horizontal protection level 
(HPL) is available, the area where the plane is located can 
be considered in the DTED. Depending on the resolution 
of the map several data points might lie within this region. 
Together with the beam width characteristics of the radar 
altimeter signals and the aircraft’s attitude a certain area 
on the ground is defined which could be seen by the 
aircraft. With increasing altitude this area gets 
significantly large, nevertheless this method leads to 
promising results for the final approach for two reasons: 
(1) the altitude above ground is rather small, thus the 
visible area for the radar altimeter is limited and (2) the 
terrain under the final approach path of an airport certified 
for CAT-II/III operations is reasonably flat. Taking all 
data points in the area and their first neighbors on the 
outside of the area to avoid uncertainty due to 
interpolation methods between data points, thus combines 
all error sources discussed in this paragraph and results in 
an uncertainty of the terrain elevation which can be 
directly derived from the database. 
 
DTEDh : The data contained in the DTE database also 
have to fulfill certain requirements to be suitable for this 
kind of application. In order to give the additional 
measurement a certain level of integrity, the elevation 
data points themselves have to come with assurance that 
the data are correct. However, mapping requirements for 
the airport areas and especially the radar altimeter 
operating areas are already existent so that this factor is 
not a big concern. ED98-A [4] requires a 95% data 
integrity and a post spacing (i.e. distance between two 
adjacent data points) of 10m. Both values are not very 
stringent for the proposed kind of application and might 
have to be reconsidered in order to achieve good results. 
The residual error is hard to model since it depends on the 
procedures of how the data were obtained in the first 
place. Thus, only an assumption as to how the errors are 
distributed can be made in our case. A more precise 
model can be derived, however, when taking a closer look 
at the map and its creation. For our purposes it seemed 
reasonable to assume a Gaussian error distribution.  
 
84WGSh : One other possible source of errors is the 
common reference to the WGS84 ellipsoid of the earth. 
Usually the terrain elevation databases are giving terrain 
elevation above mean sea level (MSL). The sea level 
reference, however, is not common to all countries. The 
correct definition of sea level and its reference to the 
WGS84 ellipsoid has to be known and considered to 
avoid the introduction of systematic errors due to 
incorrect or imprecise data conversions.  Since the land 
Visible area of RA 
survey offices until today are often using UTM 
coordinates or similar, the same holds for conversion of 
the coordinates to WGS84 coordinates. It usually can be 
assumed that a correct conversion model is available, and 
thus a Gaussian model is assumed to bound errors 
introduced by the approximation through Legendre 
polynomials [10]. 
 
Another issue to be considered is the timing between the 
radar altimeter and the GNSS measurements. Since the 
aircraft is moving at speeds typically around 70m/s on the 
final approach, even small asynchronisms can lead to 
significant errors in the terrain elevation look-up. If it is 
not possible to trigger the measurements simultaneously 
interpolation has to be performed. Course, speed and sink 
rate are very well known and are a very suitable base for 
accurate interpolation. However, in this case an error 
model as to how the timing affects the look-up has to be 
created. This can be done for example by increasing the 
position uncertainty and increasing the area considered 
before in the -section.  meash
 
With the possibilities of errors evaluated and each 
individual source of error modeled, it is now possible to 
obtain a total uncertainty for the additional range. In order 
to fit to the standard concept in satellite navigation this 
uncertainty can be defined as a standard deviation of a 
Gaussian distribution. This practice of Gaussian 
overbounding is commonly used, however, not without 
controversy [11]. In order to get a first good insight and 
comply with the standard methods the cumulative density 
function (CDF) overbounding as described in [12] can be 
followed. Other methods have been developed later on 
and are described e.g. in [13]. 
  
The newly derived variance can then be used in a second 
position solution just like those of the satellite ranges to 
appropriately weigh the new range in the overall solution.  
 
APPLICATION TO FLIGHT TEST DATA 
In November 2009 flight trials with the Vfw-614 research 
aircraft “ATTAS” for evaluation of DLR’s experimental 
GBAS station in Braunschweig were carried out. The 
airport of Braunschweig is rather small and has a CAT-I 
ILS for runway 26. When approaching from the east to 
that runway (as done in these flight trials), there is a forest 
area reaching as close as about 450m to the threshold and 
about 950m to the touchdown point on the runway. From 
these flights radar altimeter data together with position 
information with integrity information were used to 
evaluate the proposed method. A terrain database of the 
area around the airport was available from the land survey 
office. As mentioned in the last section, this terrain model 
was created by laser scanning and had a post spacing of 
10 meters. The big spacing between the points compared 
with to the relatively small horizontal protection levels 
lead us to use a linear interpolation of the altitude at a 
certain point from its four neighboring data points 
available. The radar altimeter used was a Collins 860F-1. 
According to the manual it is specified to provide altitude 
information below 2500ft above ground level (AGL) with 
an accuracy of +-2ft or +-2% whichever is greater. Thus 
an output accuracy of +-2ft up to 100ft AGL and for 
higher altitudes an increasing uncertainty could be 
expected. Its output rate is 25Hz. The GNSS receiver on 
board was a Topcon NetG3 of which single frequency 
recorded pseudorange measurements at a recording rate of 
20Hz were used. GBAS corrections and integrity 
parameters for protection level calculation were processed 
in the experimental GBAS ground station consisting of 
three reference receivers and fulfilling the CAT-I criteria. 
A post processed carrier phase solution of the recorded 
flight data serves as reference for all evaluations. For 
illustration an approach to runway 26 with a low pass 
over the airfield in 100ft AGL and a subsequent go-
around is presented here in detail. Unfortunately no 
reliable attitude information from the flights was available 
to investigate the influence of attitude. Another drawback 
in the flight trials was the DTED which were preliminary 
data from laser-scanning with no integrity information 
and the already mentioned problem of different reference 
altitudes compared to the radar altimeter. Since this kind 
of information was not available, a complete evaluation of 
the proposed method was not possible. Instead a 
simplified standard deviation of 1 meter on the additional 
range was assumed. This value is too optimistic for the 
areas outside the airport, but rather conservative when 
flying over the runway at low altitudes. 
 
The following graph shows the results of the 
determination of the terrain altitude.  
 
Figure 5. Terrain elevation determined from position 
and radar altitude (blue) and true terrain elevation 
from DTED. Red arrows mark overflight of beginning 
and end of forest 
 
The blue curve shows the estimates of terrain elevation 
resulting from GBAS augmented GNSS position and the 
radar altitude measurements with all contributing errors as 
described in the previous section, while the black curve 
shows the correct terrain elevation from the DTED at the 
location. What can be seen very clearly in this plot is the 
issue of vegetation underneath the flight path. The big 
jumps in the blue curve marked with the red arrows 
correspond to the flyover of beginnings or ends of forest 
areas where the difference in the sensors becomes most 
obvious. It becomes very clear that sensors with similar 
characteristics should be used to produce the database and 
then during the approach to the airport. Another thing 
which can be observed is a trend of decreasing error when 
approaching the runway between seconds 0 and 50. This 
can be explained by the improving accuracy for lower 
measured altitudes as described before. During the low 
pass from seconds 50 to 65 the estimated and the true 
terrain elevation match very well. During this time the 
runway was a convenient reflecting surface and the terrain 
was sufficiently flat. Under these conditions which are 
usually found at an airport and underneath the final 
approach segment from the 200ft decision height point to 
touchdown for CAT-III capable airports the database 
together with the radar altimeter yields good results.  
 
Next we incorporated the additional range into the 
position solution. The GBAS augmented position solution 
was only used for determination of the protection level. 
The blue GNSS curve in the plot are GPS standalone 
results which have a bigger vertical error and higher noise 
than the GBAS solution. This was done to show the 
possible benefits in case of a bias on the GNSS solution. 
The results for the vertical errors (in reference to the 
carrier phase solution) are shown in the following plot.  
 
Figure 6. Vertical errors of GNSS with radar altimeter 
(red) and without (blue) 
 
As we expected the errors in the synthesized terrain 
elevation show up directly in the vertical position solution 
with the jumps at the same positions and about the same 
introduced error. However, when overflying the airport 
where the radar altitude measurements were sufficiently 
good, the overall position results are fitting the true 
position extremely well and were generally slightly better 
than the GNSS solution.   
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
We investigated the integration of radar altimeter 
information into a GNSS position solution. First flight 
tests showed that the method gives good results over flat 
terrain but is not suitable over uneven areas with 
vegetation. In order to achieve integrity for the new 
position the error sources have to be understood and 
modeled. After appropriate overbounding a variance for 
the new range can be determined and used for appropriate 
weighting in the position solution and in a next step also 
for integrity considerations.  
 
If sufficient trust can be put into the new measurement 
and its derived variance it might also be used for 
protection level calculations or other integrity assurance 
techniques in the future.  
 
The method also provides a valuable means of 
crosschecking two systems. Radar altimeter 
measurements and GNSS data are completely 
independent but are very important systems on which the 
autopilot heavily relies during landing. Even with a bias 
in one of the systems the combination of both and the 
complementary geometrical characteristics result in an 
improved overall position solution. Incorporation of the 
radar altitude in the GNSS solution and possibly increased 
weighting of the new range with decreasing altitude 
produces more reliable and smoother results than when 
both systems are used independently.  
 
Hence, the touch-down dispersion on the runway due to 
navigation system error (NSE) can be significantly 
reduced and results in safer operations under low 
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